For over half a decade, Syria, one of the key states in the Middle Eastern region has been experiencing turmoil. Many consider ethnic and religious differences as the main source of the conflict. While this starting point is correct, analysts have failed to emphasize the energy conflicts in the background of the international and regional frontlines. The paper aims to investigate the energy related motivations of the most important regional and global actors amidst the conflict in Syria.
Introduction
In recent years, Syria has become the main battlefield of the shift in power in the Middle East.
It is becoming more and more obvious that the events in Syria which began on 15 March 2011 are not simply rooted in the totalitarian regime of Bashar el-Assad and the subsequent internal social unrest (the Arab Spring). The country is ruled by chaos, and besides the self-destructive nature of social unrest, the regional and global powers' race for power is an active contributor to this chaos.
The media is limited to reporting religious and ethnic differences and the losses in the daily battles. Reports of the military conflicts, cooperation or struggles of local, regional and global political powers are also heard often (Carpenter 2013; Jenkins 2014) . However another decisive aspect of the modern history of the Middle East is much less talked about: the issue of energy, which is a key part in the political and military games of the region. Although in the fighting in Syria ad hoc or tight power coalitions and disputes are closely interconnected with the energy strategy of the countries, for some reason these aspects are much less studied.
Specifically, there have been few unified examinations of the geopolitical and energy policy aspects of the Syrian conflict.
It is a fact, the current fall of oil prices and their being stuck at low levels might reduce the interest in energy safety. This attitude might be strengthened by the fact that from a Central and Eastern European perspective, interruptions in gas supply safety and the shutting down of the taps seems remote. At the same time, in the media the previous great gas pipeline disputes (Nabucco vs. South Stream) have faded away. Still, the energy issue is a crucial component of the Middle Eastern situation, and of the conflict in Syria. Following the migrant crisis of 2015, it is obvious that the region is closer to Europe than had been previously thought, and the problems there affect the Central and Eastern European region, also from the aspect of energy supply safety.
This paper aims to present the energy related interests of the regional and global participating states in the war in Syria, and their strategies and tactics from a Central and Eastern European perspective.
1 The paper does not however make suggestions or predictions about the military Eastern Europe, so the energy analysis will touch upon the limited role of the European Union as well. The paper only mentions the strategies of the local players (Syrian resistance groups, Syrian, Iraqi and Turkish Kurds, Islamic State etc.) to the extent to which they influence the energy related concerns of the regional and global participating states.
Since land transit could result in a diversification potential for Central and Eastern Europe due to the geographical position of Syria, the analysis focuses on the classical pipeline development opportunities. Issues of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market are not the subject of the study. It is important to highlight that due to the common factors of pipeline 1 As in business studies stakeholder-oriented leadership (Blaskovics 2016 ) is a crucial issue, the interests of the regional and global participants are also of key importance in energy strategies. 2 Iraq is left out of the energy strategy analysis because the government mainly focused on regaining control of the territories lost by the Islamic State.
networks, fossil fuels (oil, natural gas) are uniformly (and not separately) discussed in the study.
Supply security dilemmas in Central and Eastern Europe with reference to the

Middle East
Since the middle of the 2000s, mostly due to the 2006 and 2009 Russian-Ukrainian energy disputes, the desire for secure supply in Europe became stronger. Several experts drew attention to the need of countries dependant on hydrocarbon imports to diversify their fossil fuel supply, if possible (Wallander 2006) . This means that it would be favourable for these countries to get their fossil fuel imports from more sources and through more routes.
Many countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have started to see serious opportunities in the emergence of alternative transport and production technologies in order to remedy the security issues of gas supply, namely in the unfolding of LNG import and unconventional gas production. All of these ideas were closely linked to the concept of a North-South energy corridor supported by the EU and the CEE member states.
For CEE this meant getting alternative transportation routes to have access to energy sources of other regions beyond the Russian sources (Emerson 2006) . In the essentially geopolitical rivalries, the dispute over diversification became a central topic in the construction of the Blue Stream, and then the South Stream pipelines, both Russian initiatives, and their competitor, the Nabucco pipeline, which would have opened to Middle Eastern and Caspian sources (Virág 2014) . Although South Stream and Nabucco are off the agenda now, the underlying dilemma remains. The importance of diversification of the routes and sources stays equally important in CEE, even if the related ideas have become overshadowed by other international topics. Several factors indicate that this problem will continue to be relevant.
The relationships between Russia and Ukraine have reached an all-time low, which heavily influences the supply security of the region. Following the Russian-Ukrainian conflicts, Ukraine started to seek means to become energy independent from Russia. Today, Ukraine wishes to become the periphery of the EU, and not of Russia (Braun -Póti 2016) . As a consequence, Gazprom did not give up on its plans to establish gas pipelines which bypass
Ukraine after the failure of the South Stream, but this will not change the source diversification of CEE significantly.
Moreover, Russia has mentioned several times that it might abolish gas transportation to Europe across Ukraine in 2019, i.e. when the current transit contract between Russia and Ukraine expires, which will be a significant challenge for the Central and Eastern European region (Gazprom 2015) . This means that even if the Turkish Stream is created as a little sibling to either the Nord Stream 2 or the South Stream, it will not promote the source diversification of the region. Replacing the Ukrainian route is only a swap in transportation corridors.
Despite the diversification deficit, not much is talked about channelling alternative energy sources into the CEE region, such as from the Middle East.
The Middle Eastern turn: the Iran nuclear deal
A major obstacle in the Nabucco pipelines, meant to bring about diversification of sources and routes, was that no appropriate export partner was found, and those that were available did not have enough transportable gas. For long the states of the Caspian region seemed to be the most likely partners, but the investments did not. As an alternative to Nabucco, the socalled TAP pipeline might be constructed, which would avoid the Central and Eastern
European region. The Central and South Eastern Europe Gas Connectivity (CESEC) is in charge of how different countries link to that pipeline and related issues (CESEC 2015) .
While the idea of the Nabucco was fading away, there have been several changes in the Middle East. On 14 July 2015, after the signing of the Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 2015), Iran regained much of its power in the Middle East. Following the agreement, the sanctions were lifted and Iran could obtain significant economic and political benefits, which could be used to increase its influence in the region. As the sanctions are lifted, the European Union may again become Iran's most important trading partner (Gálik et al. 2015) .
This provides the opportunity for major changes in the energy status quo of the Middle East in the future. (Roberts 2015) .
According to BP's statistics, although Iran possesses the world's largest natural gas reserves, thus providing over 18% of the global supply, it is not much ahead of Qatar, which possesses 13% of the world's reserves (BP 2016) . To make things more complicated, the two countries share the world's largest gas reserve, the South Pars/North Dome gas field. Estimates say this reserve would be able to provide enough gas for the members of the European Union for 70 years, if the current storage and production levels are kept. The geopolitical problem is that they do not want to cooperate. The question has always been whether it is possible, and if so, who enjoys the benefits of the field. During the international embargo on Iran it was obvious that it had no power in Europe. This situation may change drastically with the lifting of the embargo.
Seeking new export routes: Turkey and Syria become more appreciated, but also rivals
The conflict in Syria brought several dilemmas to the surface about Turkey as the bilateral political relations that previously seemed to improve and become relatively stable started to decline. The unstable political situation has unfavourable effects on economic relations, and there is a huge flow of migrants towards the Syrian-Turkish border. In addition, the threat imposed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the challenges of national security provoked by the possibility of autonomy of the Kurdish people in Syria, and the deterioration of the Turkish and Iranian relationships each pose great risks for Turkey (Hinnebusch -Tür 2013) .
Thanks to its geographical location, Turkey may find serious opportunities in energy strategies in the conflict in Syria. Turkey realized its opportunities stemming from its transit roles and has been interested in joining and driving any alternative pipeline projects that might link Europe to Asia in an East to West direction. In the middle of the 2000s, Turkey was not satisfied with the mediator's role it was assigned in the Nabucco versus South Stream debate, but wished to become the distribution centre and a trader in the given pipeline project.
It wanted to buy natural gas at its Eastern borders for a low price, and resell it at a higher price on Western European markets (Deák 2007: 131) . Therefore, there is a palpable energy conflict behind the conflict in Syria. The question is whether certain regional participants and superpowers formed their strategies and tactics in the Syrian peace process in accordance or in opposition to this.
The conflict in Syria and the regional participants
Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
The supporters of the opposition fighting the Assad regime include as key figures the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), countries that have huge crude oil and natural gas reserves, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Some say that the relationship of these countries to Islamic State is more than controversial (Rogin 2014) . Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria over 3 000 people left the GCC countries to fight in various rebel groups. The oil states have done nothing in particular to stop these people (Al-Rasheed 2015) .
Moreover, the GCC countries, and mainly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have been supporting different groups, which significantly contributed to the fragmentation of the Syrian opposition. The Qatar-Saudi rivalry remains, except for a short period in 2014, and was eased by a change in the Saudi king and worsened by the Iran nuclear deal. Finally, the weakening of the Muslim Brotherhood brought peace in the difference of interests. From that point, the most important common goal of Qatar and Saudi Arabia was to overthrow president Assad, who was blocking Sunni energy cooperation (Arany et al. 2016: 266-267) . A further problem 5 The full name of the organization is the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG). The GCC was created in 1981 by the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman and Saudi Arabia. The establishment of the group was propelled by fear from the export of the Iranian revolution, and is currently dominated by the shift in the regional power status quo. Energy related questions are a key element of this.
is that the Free Syrian Army could not efficiently and transparently distribute the obtained support, which could have ended up with extremist groups.
Turkey
In the beginning, it seemed that the Middle Eastern countries that started a reform after the Arab Spring could follow Turkey's example. However, the revolutionary processes did not yield the expected results. Turkey's strategies "first led to a point where the 'zero problems with the neighbours' foreign policy became unsustainable and obsolete, second to an unsuccessful attempt of transforming the states of the Middle Eastern region, and third to a dead end of supporting moderate Islamist movements" (Arany et al. 2016: 260) .
Turkey had the aim of overthrowing the Assad regime and preventing the Kurdish autonomy in Northern Syria. From an energy aspect, the aim of Turkey was to stabilise and increase the existing and potential energy transit positions. With Syria, Turkey's main purpose was to block the possibilities of transit through Syria, and to subdue it under Turkish interests.
The Turkish government expressed its support for the Syrian opposition on 15 November 2011. By 2012 it was clear for the general public that Turkey is also supporting the Free Syrian Army, and it openly cooperates with the United States, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, namely the group of countries that indirectly help the rebels both with funding and arms (Schmitt 2012) . The operating centre of the Free Syrian Army was also established in Turkey.
Bilateral relationships eventually turned sour in lack of a stronger US influence, and Turkey, just like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, built its own network of allies among the opposition.
By the summer of 2012 the border crossings between Syria and Turkey were under the control of the Syrian opposition, and the primary supply routes of the opposition groups were coming from Turkey, which led to Islamic State gaining strength in the region. 6 Finally, the strengthening US-Kurdish cooperation forced Turkey to open towards Russia. So following a highly visible breakup of the two parties, 7 an agreement was signed, but its precise details were not disclosed.
Iran
For 
Israel
The relationship between Israel and Syria has been burdened by territorial disputes for decades. In the war of 1967, some 70% of the Golan Heights came under Israeli rule. The territory, annexed in 1981, has strategic importance for the Jewish state due to its location and water reserves. Before the Arab Spring, the Israeli defence suggested offering territorial concessions to its North-Eastern neighbour with the aim of easing the Syrian-Irani relationship, but the conflict in Syria removed this opportunity from the agenda (CsikiGazdik 2013: 59) . 7 The temporary (9-month) breakup between Putin and Erdoğan was caused when Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet which was bombing in Syria and violated Turkish airspace.
Although some say a Syrian regime change might favour the Israeli government, however, if the stability of Syria is permanently lost, that would be a risk for the security of Israel state.
The fact that Syria has become a failed state and a cradle for terrorism is a potential threat to the Jewish state. This forces Israel to carefully consider its moves. Israel therefore mainly focuses on keeping an eye on the events and securing its Northern borders.
Israel is experiencing fast population growth, which leads to increasing energy demands.
Heavy dependence on foreign hydrocarbon sources, mostly from Egypt, is a serious problem for the country. Israel and Egypt signed a long-term agreement in 2005 which says that Egypt sells natural gas to Israel through a branch of the Arab gas pipeline, coming through the Sinai Peninsula to Jordan and Syria. Transportation began in 2008, but the Arab Spring brought uncertainty. In 2011 terrorists blew up the gas pipeline seven times and as a consequence the Egyptian gas exports to Israel were stopped.
Eventually, the challenges in Israel's supply security were solved by discovering their own hydrocarbon reserves. In 1999 the Jam Thetis consortium discovered the first significant natural gas fields at sea, only 30 kilometres off the coast of Askelon. Following ten years of research, the US energy industry consortium, Noble Energy 8 , discovered in 2009 the Tamar natural gas field, 90 kilometres west of the city of Haifa, from which regular extraction began in 2013. The annual 12 billion cubic metres of natural gas reach the Asdod terminal through underwater gas pipelines. According to more recent research, there is a huge and continuous natural gas and oil field at the bottom of the Mediterranean Sea, from the Israeli coast all the way to Cyprus. At a territory of 83 thousand square kilometres, there are estimates of 10-15 thousand billion cubic metres of natural gas in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea.
Therefore, the Tamar gas field is not the only one where production is possible. In December 2010, the Leviathan gas field was discovered, which has the largest known reserves to date.
These discoveries secure Israel's supply of electricity, reducing its price significantly. These reserves make gas imports unnecessary in the future, and the country can become a significant natural gas exporter. In June 2013, the government ruled that 40% of the Israeli natural gas can be exported.
According to current international regulations, Israel is solely entitled to extract the natural resources at the bottom of the sea in a radius of 560 kilometres from its coasts. However, due to historical, geographical and political reasons, the situation is far from simple. Lebanon also demands the underwater reserves. There are heavy debates about the rights over the gas fields across the Gaza strip, too.
Given that Cyprus is only 200 kilometres away from Haifa, Turkey, which occupies part of the island, might also demand the gas fields. In December 2010, Israel and Cyprus marked the borders of the maritime economic region between the two countries. They negotiated about building a new pipeline, which would transport natural gas from the gas fields located between the Israeli and Cyprian coasts first to Cyprus, then across Greece to other European countries. A possibility of a Turkish export route also came up, but that would first require the settlement of the situation in Cyprus in general.
The conflict in Syria and the superpowers
In the events of the conflict in Syria, superpowers such as Russia and the United States have key roles. Energy related interests are clear in these cases as well.
Russia
By the middle of the 2000s, the Middle East was only secondary in Russian foreign policy, compared to the relationships of Russia to the US and to Europe. Starting from 2005, Russia began to form closer relationships with the countries of the region because of the latter relations. 9 The main motivations for Russia were trafficking arms and energy related concerns (Allison 2013 ).
It had little success in influencing energy prices at the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) and through its Saudi connections in the OPEC. Although Russian energy companies are present in almost all states of the Middle Eastern region, its income from extraction is not significant. For Russia the most important area in which it has indirect influence is the hydrocarbon trade. Russia predominantly exports to Europe, therefore its aim is to preserve its market positions there. In this respect, the Middle East is a constant rival, as it is the third most important source for imported gas to the European Union, and the second largest for crude oil imports.
Russia has few allies in the region: besides Iran, 10 Besides, Russia has strong energy related motivations, mostly about crude oil and natural gas.
Before the conflict in Syria, the most significant Russian company in the region was the Stroytransgaz, the builder of the 324 kilometre Syrian section of the Arab Gas Pipeline 10 After the 1979 revolution, Iran sought relations to improve its relations with Russia. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the bilateral relationship remained strong. The Western sanctions over Iran caused it to establish a strong commercial partnership with Russia. The nuclear cooperation between the two countries remained strong even after the Iran nuclear deal.
During the Arab Spring, Russia had a reactive, defensive behaviour, and sometimes showed controversial politics (Tálas -Varga 2013: 75) . Syrian opposition militia, not even on territories where the major centres of ISIS were located, but in the areas crucial to the survival of the present regime" (Arany et al. 2016: 284) .
The active military intervention offered an opportunity for Putin to break out from international isolation following the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and what is more, the preservation of the conflict, and consequently the instability of the Middle East conserves the energy status quo as well.
The USA and Europe
The prestige of the United States has faded in the past decade and a half due to its wars against terror. The biggest military and economic power of the world and its allies still see an opportunity to push back Iran and Russia, close allies of Syria, even after the Iran nuclear deal.
With a heavy legacy of the Bush administration, Barack Obama announced pragmatic and cooperative politics in the Middle East at the beginning of his presidency. As a sign of this, in 2010 a US ambassador was appointed to Syria. Probably Obama's biggest diplomatic move of his two terms was to reach an agreement with Iran and had the Iran nuclear deal 11 signed, and promote peace talks between Syria and Israel, despite heavy debates with certain Republicans in Congress.
Despite the US measures, the relationship between Syria and the USA has been burdened with long standing differences that have several roots. The Syrian regime has had a close relationship with Iran and cooperated with Hezbollah of Lebanon, the Palestinian Hamas and has unsettled relations with Israel. The question is whether in the case of the Iran nuclear deal the USA indeed wanted to remove all obstacles from the way of a Iran-Syria axis. Is it in the interests of the US that Iran gains a large share of the European energy market, at the expense of its Sunni allies? Taking into consideration the former politics of the United States, the answer is a clear "no".
It is true that the events in Syria hit the US administration unprepared. Therefore, US diplomacy was very careful in its reactions, fearing the escalation of the conflict. Although the Obama administration used the politics of gradual change, it basically approved the antiAssad movements and gradually increased its pressure on the Syrian regime using diplomatic means. In doing so, the USA had two strategic partners in the region, Turkey and Saudi 
13
Since the failure of the opportunities for consolidation in Syria, the United States has been closely cooperating with the GCC countries. An undisclosed secret service document claims that in 2012 the USA was already aware of the fact that the GCC countries and Turkey wished to form an enclave led by extremist Salafists in Syria in order to break up the territories dominated by the Shia. This implicit support politics worked until Islamic State, formed later, started to openly threaten the Western world (Varga 2015) .
12 See the Partners Planning Syria Crisis Group, a French initiated international group; the Kofi Annan peace plan; and the Lakhdar Brahimi peace plan. 13 According to the diplomatic documents leaked by Wikileaks, the United States financed Syrian opposition groups even before the Arab Spring (Whitlock 2011 ).
The Obama administration broadened its relationship with Syrian opposition organizations, partly with the aim of gathering credible information about the reliability of these groups, their organizational and control infrastructure, and provide its partners in the Gulf region with that information (Csiki -Gazdik 2013: 65) . Western secret services also provided support to some Syrian opposition groups that were close to extremist Islamic organizations. It is important to note however, that the political relationship between the USA and the GCC countries was never spotless, despite their common interests in the case of Syria. An indicator of this is that the US administration did not start military intervention despite a UN study, which's findings were published on 21 August 2013, said that sarin gas was used in a district In the future, we face the interesting questions of what shape the US relations with Iran, Israel, Turkey and the countries of the Gulf region will take, taking into consideration the dilemmas about the security of supply of energy. The USA has lost the initiative and its leading position in the fight against the Islamic State, and in the Syrian peace process. The question is whether this is going to change with the presidency of Donald Trump.
As for the European Union, its Syrian politics are not much different from those of the US.
One reason for this, besides the lack of a uniform foreign policy, is that at the time of the eruption of the crisis, the EU was preoccupied with its own economic crisis and the Greek crisis, and later with handling the processes which threaten the future of European integration (such as rising Euro-scepticism and Brexit). Although the cold relations between the EU and Russia have been influencing the foreign policy agenda of the EU for some time, the possibility of diversifying crude oil and natural gas supplies did not really come up in European capitals. When the EU decision makers were thinking about the Middle East, they were concerned about the challenges posed by migration, and not about source diversification of hydrocarbon imports. This is one of the main consequences of the permanent crisis in Syria.
The marginalization of the transport potential of Syria could open the door to the exports by applying LNG technology, from which the East Central European region could also benefit, if the development of the right network infrastructure and capacities took place in the future. In addition, other alternative hydrocarbon resources may also be available, e.g. the gas assets discovered in the West of the Black Sea, or of the huge Israeli, Cypriot and Egyptian Zohr Fields in the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea, which are still unexploited.
